UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-29-2012

Cobell v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39321

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Cobell v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39321" (2012). Not Reported. 664.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/664

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF I

EUGENE RAY COBELL,

)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DOCKET NO. 39321

)
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6406
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

r~·.,--·-·- ~

l MAY2~~

CourL__Court of llj)f)eais___
En!ered on ATS by

ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5
I.

The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing
Mr. Cobell's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief .................................................................................................... 5
A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 5
8. The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing
Mr. Cobell's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief ............................................................................................... 5
1. Summary Dismissal Stand And Standard Of
Review ....................................................................................... 5
2. Mr. Cobell's Claim Was Properly Presented
In A Successive Petition ............................................................ 7

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 10
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) ....................................................... 9
Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 651 P.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1982) ......................... 6
Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897 (Ct. App. 1995) .................................................. 9
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 128 P.3d 975 (Ct. App. 2006) ........................ 8, 10
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 892 P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1995) ..................... 5, 6
Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 128 P.3d 938 (2006) ........................................ 7
Palmer v. McDermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.23d 955 (1981) ................................ 8
Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373 (1991) ........................................... 5
Sma/lv. State, 132 Idaho 327,971 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App. 1998) ............................ 6
Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 448 P.2d 649 (1968) ............................................ 6

Statutes
I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911 ....................................................................................... 5
I.C. § 19-4903 ....................................................................................................... 6
I.C. § 19-4906(b) .............................................................................................. 6, 7

1.C. § 19-4906(c) ............................................................................................... 6, 7
I.C. § 19 4908 ....................................................................................................... 7

Rules
I.R.C.P. 56 ............................................................................................................ 6

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Eugene Ray Cobell appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing
his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

The district court dismissed the

petition, on the ground that Mr. Cobell's claim of ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel was not a proper basis upon which to file a successive petition for
post-conviction relief. The district court erred.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Cobell was charged and convicted of rape and forcible penetration with a
foreign object. 1

(R., p.22.)

On June 5, 2008, the district court imposed concurrent

sentences of life, with ten years determinate, on each charge. (R., p.22.) Mr. Cobell
unsuccessfully appealed. (R., p.22.) He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
which was dismissed on June 18, 2010.

(R., p.23.) No appeal was taken from that

dismissal. (R., p.23.)
On July 28, 2011, Mr. Cobell filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., p.3.) He asserted that his first petition was dismissed due to inadvertent omission
of key claims and issues, including a claim of actual innocence. (R., p.4.) He further
claimed that, due to a medical issue, he was incapable of committing the alleged crime,
and this issue raised a "question of ineffective counsel to investigate, expose, and

The record of the district court proceedings in Mr. Cobell's criminal case and his first
post-conviction proceeding were never made part of the record in this case and the
district court did not take judicial notice of such records. Accordingly, the procedural
history cited in this brief comes from the State's Brief on Objection to Second Petition
for Post Conviction Relief and Motion to Dismiss.
1

1

present this issue, and opens a gateway to other claims of legal malpractice by trial
attorney." (R., p.8.) He also asserted that his petition alleged prosecutorial misconduct
at both the trial and sentencing.

(R., pp.9-10.)

He specifically asserted that a

successive petition could be used to "correct the manifest injustice of denial of ability to
effectively file the first U.P.C.P.A." (R., p.15.) He concluded that he was trying to assert
issues that he was not given a fair opportunity to present in his initial post-conviction.
(R., p.18.)
The State filed a brief which objected to the petition and moved to dismiss. (R.,
p.22.) The State asserted that Mr. Cobell's successive petition had not alleged any
reason why grounds for relief were not raised in the first petition, and "to the extent
Cobell's first petition challenged the validity of the district court's judgment the instant
petition is barred by I.C. § 19-4908." (R., p.26.)
The district court then issued a notice of intent to summarily dismiss the
successive petition.

(R., p.27.)

The district court concluded, "the petitioner's sole

argument that his claims were not adequately raised in his initial post conviction petition
is that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. However, because there is no right
to post-conviction counsel, a petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction
counsel is without merit."

(R., pp.27-28.)

Further, "[b]ecause the petitioner has not

made any showing why the [sic] his claims were not previously raised, the Court cannot
consider this petition." (R., p.28.)
Mr. Cobell responded to the court's notice, but the district court summarily
dismissed the petition for the reasons set forth in the notice of intent to dismiss. (R.,
pp.29; 32.) Mr. Cobell appealed. (R., p.34.) Because a claim of ineffective assistance

2

of prior post-conviction is a proper basis upon which to file a successive petition for
post-conviction relief, he asserts that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his
petition.

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Cobell's successive petition for
post-conviction relief?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Cobell's Successive Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
In this case, the district court identified a sole basis for the summary dismissal of

Mr. Cobell's successive petition for post-conviction relief: that a claim of ineffective
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel was not a proper basis upon which to file a
successive petition. Because both the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have
held to the contrary, the district court erred.
B.

The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Cobell's Successive
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
1.

Summary Dismissal Standard And Standard Of Review

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is separate and
distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction.
Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456 (1991 ).

It is a civil proceeding governed by the

Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911)
and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is a civil
proceeding, the petitioner must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995). However, the petition
initiating post-conviction proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A
post-conviction petition is required to include more than "a short and plain statement of
the claim"; it "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be
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attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached."

Id.; I.C. § 19-4903. "In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to
dismissal." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998).
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.C. § 19-4906(c). 2

In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the

district court need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez,
126 Idaho at 816-17.

However, if the petitioner presents evidentiary support for his

allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's allegations as true, at least until
such time as they are controverted by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646
(1968). This is so even if the allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. Thus, only
after the State controverts the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the
evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must
still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner.
Small, 132 Idaho at 331.
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at 331.

2

If there is no

Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(b), which deals with motions for
summary disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals as well. See, e.g.,
Small, 132 Idaho at 331 (discussing the standard for summary disposition under section
19-4906 generally as being whether a genuine issue of material fact has been
presented).

6

question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can
be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's motion. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c).
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never involve the
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court's summary dismissal
order de nova. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006).

2.

Mr. Cobell's Claim Was Properly Presented In A Successive Petition

The UPCPA provides that, generally, only one petition for post-conviction relief is
allowed. I.C. § 19-4908. There is an exception, however, for situations in which there is
"a ground for relief asserted [in a successive petition] which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
application."

Id.

Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held that the ineffective

assistance of post-conviction counsel is just such a "sufficient reason" for the petitioner
to raise or re-raise claims through successive petitions for post-conviction relief.
Indeed, on the issue of inadequately-raised claims, the Court of Appeals recently held
as follows:
A successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily
dismissed if the grounds for relief were finally adjudicated or waived in the
previous post-conviction proceeding. I.C. § 19-4908. Such grounds may
be re-litigated, however, if the petitioner shows sufficient reason why they
were inadequately presented in the original case. Id. Therefore, although
a claim of ineffective post-conviction counsel, standing alone, is not
grounds for post-conviction relief, an allegation that a claim was not
adequately presented in the first post-conviction action due to the
deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient
reason to permit the claims to be presented again in a subsequent
petition.

7

Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added). In Griffin, the
district court had summarily dismissed the petitioner's successive petition on the
following basis:

"It does not appear that any new issues have been presented ....

[T]his Court hereby notifies the above parties of its intention to dismiss the application
for post-conviction relief . . . because it is a successive application raising issues
already adjudicated which is not permitted." Griffin, 142 Idaho at 440.

Under these

circumstances (and in light of the standard articulated above), the Court of Appeals held
that the district "court's notice of intent to dismiss was insufficient or erroneous because
the court did not give proper consideration to Griffin's allegation that his first postconviction action was dismissed due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel," and it vacated the district court's dismissal order and remanded the case. Id.
at 441-42.
Thus, it is clear that a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
can present a sufficient reason to file a successive petition. The Idaho Supreme Court
agrees.

See, e.g., Palmer v. McDermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596 (1981) ("[l]neffective

assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, would warrant a finding that the
omission in the prior post-conviction proceeding of the allegations now being raised
anew by [the petitioner] was not a result of an active, knowing choice made by [the
petitioner] through his prior court-appointed attorney, and would therefore provide
sufficient reason for permitting the newly asserted allegations to be raised in the instant
petition.").
In its notice of intent to dismiss, the district court articulated only one basis for
dismissal. (R., p.27.) The district court concluded, "the petitioner's sole argument that

8

his claims were not adequately raised in his initial post conviction petition is that his
post-conviction counsel was ineffective.

However, because there is no right to post-

conviction counsel, a petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel is
without merit."

(R., pp.27-28.)

Further, "[b]ecause the petitioner has not made any

showing why the [sic] his claims were not previously raised, the Court cannot consider
this petition." (R., p.28.) The district court cited Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897 (Ct.
App. 1995), for this proposition. Follinus is inapplicable.
In Follinus, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that
his trial counsel was ineffective. Id. at 899. The district court summarily dismissed his
petition and he appealed. Id. During the appeal, the defendant asserted that his postconviction counsel was ineffective.

Id.

The Court of Appeals concluded, "because

there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings 'a
petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such
proceedings."' Id. at 902 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991 )). As
such, "a denial of effective representation does not merit a remedy on appeal where
there is no right to counsel." Id. at 903.
The district court misapplied Follinus. Fo/linus applies where a petitioner seeks
relief due to the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.

This is a

separate issue from whether the alleged ineffective of post-conviction counsel can
justify a successive petition, which Griffin discussed: "
although a claim of ineffective post-conviction counsel, standing alone, is
not grounds for post-conviction relief, an allegation that a claim was not
adequately presented in the first post-conviction action due to the
deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient
reason to permit the claims to be presented again in a subsequent
petition.

9

Griffin, 142 Idaho at 441.

The law is clear that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction is just such a
"sufficient reason" for the petitioner to raise or re-raise claims through successive
petitions for post-conviction relief. Because the district court erred by concluding that an
allegation of effective assistance of post-conviction counsel was not a sufficient reason
to raise claims in a successive petition, this case must be remanded for further
proceedings.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Cobell requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and his case remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this 29 th day of May, 2012.

JUSTIN M. CURTIS·.
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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